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Today’s business model for hardware designs frequently incorporates third-party 
Intellectual Property (IP) due to the many benefits it can bring to a company.  For instance, 
outsourcing certain components of an overall design can reduce time-to-market by allowing each 
party to specialize and perfect a specific part of the overall design.  However, allowing third-
party involvement also increases the possibility of malicious attacks, such as hardware Trojan 
insertion.  Trojan insertion is a particularly dangerous security threat because testing the 
functionality of an IP can often leave the Trojan undetected.  Therefore, this thesis work provides 
an improvement on a Trojan detection method known as Structural Checking which analyzes 
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) and gate-level soft IPs.  Given an unknown IP, the Structural 
Checking tool will break down the design primary ports and internal signals into assets that fall 
into six characteristics.  These characteristics organize how the IP is structured and provide 
information about the unknown IP’s overall function.  The tool also provides a library of known 
designs referred to as the Golden Reference Library (GRL).  All entries in the library are also 
broken down into the same six characteristics and are either known to be clean or known to have 
a Trojan inserted.  An overall percent match for each library entry against the unknown IP is 
calculated by first computing a percent match within each characteristic.   A weighted average of 
these percent matches makes up the final percentage.  If the library entry with the best match is 
known to have a Trojan inserted, then the unknown design is likely to have a Trojan as well and 
vice versa.  Due to the structural variability of soft IP designs, it is vital to provide the best 
possible weighting of the six characteristics to best match the unknown IP to the most similar 
library entry.  This thesis work provides a statistical approach to finding the best weights to 
optimize the Structural Checking tool’s matching algorithm.     
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Due to the growing number of third-party hardware IP vendors world-wide, the 
importance of securing hardware designs has grown significantly.  By outsourcing components 
of a hardware design to other parties, the integrity of the overall design can be compromised.  
One example of how a design can be compromised is through the insertion of a hardware Trojan 
into a third-party component.  Trojan-infested components often work as intended to hide the 
Trojan inserted.  Consequently, hardware Trojans are difficult to detect and can lead to very 
damaging payloads.  Some of these effects include leaking a secret key or shutting down a part 
of the hardware during operation.  Any compromised design can then end up in applications 
where security is vital, such as defense applications.  As a result, developing a method for 
hardware Trojan detection is very important to guarantee the integrity of all hardware.   
A significant area of research for hardware Trojan detection comes from side-channel 
analysis.  Side-channel analysis takes advantage of naturally occurring emissions of a circuit, 
such as power and timing delays, to detect modifications to the circuit.  Power analysis can be 
effective when the Trojan infested circuit emits significantly different power readings compared 
to the same circuit that is known to be clean.  A drawback from this approach is that Trojans can 
be very small and thus do not produce a significant power consumption to raise concerns about 
the integrity of the circuit.  Introduced in [1], different circuits were first partitioned and then 
power analysis was performed.  By observing the circuit in smaller portions, the difference in 
power readings is more significant and leads to better detection of even small Trojans.  Path 
delay in [2], or timing analysis, seeks to find significant differences in how long a signal takes to 
travel through a specific path within the circuit.  However, similar to power analysis, the Trojan 
inserted may not be very large which means that path delays alone may not be enough to indicate 
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an inserted Trojan.  While power and timing analysis are both valid methods of Trojan detection, 
they both focus on detecting Trojans on hard IPs, or already manufactured chips.  Even with 
correct detection at the hard IP level, the infested chips become unreliable and there is a need for 
a trusted hardware. 
Hardware Trojan detection methods at the soft IP level are also under research.  Soft IPs 
include Register-Transfer Level (RTL) code and gate-level netlists.  In [3], hardware Trojans are 
detected in gate-level netlists using a Random Forrest Classifier.  This machine learning 
approach takes advantage of features that are commonly known in Trojan nets to then classify 
unknown nets.  Another machine learning technique used to detect Trojans from netlists is 
through a support vector machine classifier [4].  The research conducted in [4] breaks down each 
net into 5 characteristics and classifies each net as either Trojan infested or Trojan free based on 
the knowledge of known Trojan free and infested nets.  In addition to these approaches, there is 
research of using Golden Reference Matching for Trojan detection as done in [5].  Golden 
Reference Matching breaks down RTL code by labeling primary ports and internal signals with 
assets, the signals’ contribution to the overall design.  Upon completion of assigning assets, an 
unknown IP is compared against the Golden Reference Library, a collection of soft IPs that are 
known to be either be clean or Trojan-infested.  If the unknown IP matches best with a Trojan-
infested library entry then the unknown IP is likely to contain a Trojan, and vice versa.  Building 
on the work of [5], [6] introduces a way to use Golden Reference Matching with gate-level 
netlists.   
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following manner.  Chapter 2 will cover 
background information on assets, Structural Checking, and the process of Golden Reference 
Matching with a Golden Reference Library.  Chapter 3 will cover the design and implementation 
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of a statistical based improvements on the Golden Reference Matching algorithm.  Chapter 4 
provides example soft IPs to prove the effectiveness of the improved algorithm.  Chapter 5 will 







A key component from the Structural Checking tool with Golden Reference Matching is 
the concept of assets.  Assets provide a description to primary ports and internal signals of soft 
IPs.  More specifically an asset provides a label to a signal about its purpose/function to the 
overall design.  For instance, a clock signal would be assigned what is known as a 
SYSTEM_TIMING asset because a clock provides timing for the overall circuit.  Each signal 
can have multiple assets assigned to it to refine how it fits in the overall design.  There are two 
main categories of assets defined in the Structural Checking tool, internal assets and external 
assets.    
2.1.2 Internal Assets 
Internal assets are intended to describe the function of internal signals in a soft IP, but they 
can also be used for primary port signals.  Most internal assets used in the tool were developed in 
[7] and [8].  The research conducted in [8] added three internal assets specifically for a scan-
chain structure (OBSERVABLE, CONTROLLABLE, and PROTECTED).  These three assets 
differ from the rest of the internal assets because they require to be manually assigned to signals.  
Most internal signals are assigned automatically as the Structural Checking tool parses the 
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) code.  Some examples of internal assets include 
PROCESS_SENSITIVE and CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN.  The PROCESS_SENSITIVE asset 
describes a signal that is included in the sensitivity list of process from RTL code.  
CONDITINAL_DRIVEN describes a signal that is within an “if/case” block in the RTL code 
because its value depends on a certain condition to be met.   
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2.1.3 External Assets 
External assets are used to describe the function/purpose of primary ports in soft IPs.  
Unlike internal assets, all external assets must be manually assigned to each primary port signal 
through the use of the Structural Checking tool.  These assets are broken up into 5 main 
categories: Data, Timing, System Control, Specific System Control, and Miscellaneous.  An 
example from the Data category includes DATA_MEMORY which is assigned to signals that 
are intended to store data for any type of memory.  COUNT is an example from the Timing 
category and this asset is assigned to signals that keep track of a count value for the IP.  An 
example from System Control includes HANDSHAKING which is assigned to signals that will 
handle any type of handshaking operations for the IP.  An example of System Specific Control 
includes COMMUNICATION_CONTROL asset and it is assigned to a signal that controls 
transmission with another component (such as a UART module).  Finally, an example from the 
Miscellaneous category includes ADDRESS_SENSITIVE and is assigned to signals that will 
store any type of address for the IP, such as a memory address.  From the work done in [5] and 
[7] the Structural Checking tool currently has 58 external assets available for assignment to 
primary ports. 
2.1.4 Asset Filtering 
The idea of asset filtering is to allow assets assigned on any signal of an IP to propagate 
through connected signals.  By propagating assets, the tool finds correlations between signals 
and potentially finds signals that have conflicting assets.  This allows the Structural Checking 
tool to raise a flag about a potential Trojan in the circuit.  Asset filtering was added to the 
Structural Checking tool in [9].  External assets assigned to primary inputs propagate to all 
signals that complete the path from the primary input to the dependent primary output.  
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Likewise, external assets assigned to primary outputs propagate backwards through connected 
signals to their dependent primary input.  For internal assets there are a few exceptions to this 
type of filtering process.  When filtering a process sensitive asset, the propagation only traverses 
to signals that are connected to the original signal and are contained within the same process 
block.  Another exception to traditional filtering comes from conditional assets 
(CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN and CONDITIONAL_DRIVING).  Similar to the process sensitive 
asset, these assets only propagate within their conditional statements.  All other internal assets 
work with concurrent statements in soft IPs, and they follow the same asset filtering process as 
external assets.       
 
Figure 1: Simple ALU Asset Filtering 
 
Figure 1 illustrates asset assignment to a simple ALU prior to asset filtering.  In the 
diagram input “A” contains data from some type of memory which is why it is assigned a 
DATA_MEMORY asset.  Input “B” stores data intended for computation which is why it is 
assigned a DATA_COMPUTATINAL asset.  The output of the ALU, “Result”, is assigned a 
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL asset because the “Result” signal is the result of the ALU’s 
computation.  “Sel” is assigned a DATA_OP asset because it controls the operation that is 
performed on the data of the ALU.  Furthermore, signals “A”, “B”, and “Result” will have 
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PROCESS_SENSITIVE assets assigned to them.  This occurs because “Sel” requires a process 
block, due to syntax rules in soft IPs, and each of these signals are contained within the same 
process block as “Sel”.  Finally, a CONDITIONAL_DRIVING asset is assigned to “Sel” and a 
CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN asset is assigned to “Result” because “Result’s” value depends on 
the value of “Sel”.  After asset filtering, “Result” will also be assigned DATA_MEMORY 
because the asset comes from filtering input A’s asset to the output.  Input “A” will add 
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL to its assets because the output’s computational asset filters to A.  
Input B will not have an additional DATA_COMPUTATIONAL asset after filtering from the 
output to B because there is no need to duplicate assets on one signal.  As a result, each signal 
becomes more refined in how it fits into the design by filtering assets.      
2.1.5 Asset Pattern and Characteristics 
Resulting from the work done in [5], an asset pattern, which is written out to an asset file, 
is a compilation of all asset traces of a soft IP.  Asset traces are created for every port/internal 
signal in a design and contain all assets assigned to it.  Assets are broken down into six 
characteristics.  External assets that are assigned to primary input port signals form a 
characteristic and they are denoted by “>” within a GRL file.  Internal assets that are assigned to 
primary input port signals form another characteristic and are denoted by “>*” within a GRL file.  
Another characteristic includes external assets that are assigned to primary output ports and they 
are denoted by “<” within a GRL file.  Internal assets that are assigned to primary output port 
signals form another characteristic and they are denoted by “<*” within a GRL file.  The final 
two characteristics are external assets assigned to internal signals and internal assets assigned to 
internal signals.  These two characteristics are denoted by “/” and “/*”, respectively, within a 
GRL file.   
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2.2 Golden Reference Matching 
2.2.1 Overview 
The concept of Golden Reference Matching is to take an unknown soft IP, compare it 
against a Golden Library of soft IPs, which are known to be Trojan-free or Trojan-infested, and 
determine if it contains a Trojan.  For each library entry, the algorithm behind the matching 
process calculates a percent match against the unknown IP by comparing the similarity of assets 
between the designs.  Based on the best percent match of the unknown IP against the Golden 
Reference entries, Golden Reference Matching can provide a probabilistic result on whether or 
not the unknown design contains a hardware Trojan and determine the overall functionality of 
the design.  Developed in [5], the SC tool uses a Golden Reference Library, which contains a list 
of known Trojan free and Trojan infested IPs.   
2.2.2 Basic Matching Process 
Table 1: Basic Matching Example 
Trace Unknown IP Assets GRL Entry Assets Percent Match 
1 DATA_COMMUNICATION DATA_COMMUNICATION 100% 





3 DATA_SENSITIVE DATA_MEMORY 0% 
 
Table 1 provides a simple example of the matching process.  Each row of Table 1 contains 
the assets assigned to a single signal from the unknown IP and assets assigned to a single signal 
from a GRL entry.  In the first row the assets are identical which gives a 100% match.  Trace 
number 2 can only match 1 out of the 3 assets which produces a 33% match.  Finally, trace 3 has 
no identical assets between the unknown IP and the GRL entry which results in a 0% match.  
These three assets traces come from the same characteristic which would result in a 44.33% 
match for that characteristic.  The same process of matching would be done for the other 5 
characteristics with the unknown IP and GRL entries.  After computing a percent match for all 
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characteristics, the overall percent match is calculated.  To calculate the overall match, an 
average is taken of the 6 percent matches from the characteristics.  When calculating percent 
matches for each of the characteristics, there are special cases such as either the unknown IP or 
the GRL entry, or both do not have any assets in a given characteristic.  In these special cases, 
the characteristic is left out of the overall percent match calculation.    
2.2.3 Partial Matching 
In [5] the idea of partial matching was added to the Structural Checking tool’s matching 
algorithm.  Partial matching involved applying a 50% match between assets that were not 
identical but shared a similar purpose in a design.  For instance, in the Data category of assets, 
there is a DATA_SENSITIVE asset that generically classifies a signal to be dependent on some 
type of data.  Within this same category there are assets such as DATA_MEMORY, 
DATA_COMMUNICATION, etc.  All of these other assets in the same category are specific 
versions of the generic DATA_SENSITIVE asset.  Consequently, the algorithm was altered to 
provide a partial match if an asset from either the unknown or the Golden Reference Library 
entry was generic while the other was specific.  
Table 2: Partial Matching Example 
Trace Unknown IP Assets GRL Entry Assets Percent Match 
1 DATA_COMMUNICATION DATA_COMMUNICATION 100% 





3 DATA_SENSITIVE DATA_MEMORY 50% 
 
Table 2 provides the same example from Table 1.  However, with partial matching, trace 
3 now has a 50% match because DATA_SENSITIVE is a generic version of the 
DATA_MEMORY asset.  In this case the overall percent match for this characteristic is 61% 
instead of 44.33%.   
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2.2.4 Golden Reference Library 
The GRL is a collection of soft IPS designs that have been collected from Trust-Hub 
[10,11], OpenCores [12], and some in-house designs.  All entries in the library first go through 
the Structural Checking tool to generate an asset pattern for the design.  After generating an asset 
pattern, a functionality is added to the file to label the overall function of the soft IP.  The 
combination of the asset pattern and the functionality encompasses all information needed for a 
library entry.  All GRL entries are guaranteed to be correctly labeled in terms of Trojan-free 
(whitelist) or Trojan-infested (blacklist) functionality because all designs come from trusted 
sources.  Table 3 below lists the functionalities that exist in the GRL. 
       Table 3: Functionalities 
Whitelist Functionality Blacklist Functionality 
SHIFT_REGISTER TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT 













Unknown IPs that match best with GRL entries with a “whitelist” functionality are given 
that same functionality and are labeled as being clean.  However, if an unknown IP matches best 
with a GRL entry that has a “blacklist” functionality, then the unknown IP is given the same 




Figure 2: Simple PIC GRL Entry 
 
Figure 2 provides an example of a GRL entry.  At the top of the file the entity’s name is 
provided along with a breakdown of the type and number of signals used in the design.  Then the 
file provides a labeled functionality which is “INTERRUPT_UNIT” in the case of Figure 2.  The 




3 METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Asset Reassignment 
The Structural Checking process described in Chapter 2 of this thesis leads to bias that 
negatively impacts matching results.  All designs that make up the Golden Reference Library, 
described in Section 2.2.4, require manual assignment of external assets.  Additionally, the 
library has continued to grow in the lifespan of the Structural Checking tool.  With this in mind, 
several developers have contributed entries to the GRL at different stages of the tool’s 
development.  As a result, designs from later stages of the tool’s development were assigned 
assets that did not exist in earlier stages.  The manual process of assigning external assets causes 
differences in what assets are assigned to signals within soft IPs.  One developer may not fully 
understand a design due to lack of documentation.  Consequently, there could be an abundance 
of generic assets assigned in this situation.  Previously mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the Structural 
Checking tool can handle matching generic assets to their specific asset counterparts with partial 
matching.  However, this way of matching always reduces the percent match to 50% even when 
the assets could theoretically be identical but are not due to bias in asset assignment.  In order to 
alleviate these issues, the idea of asset reassignment was added to the tool’s matching algorithm.   
When comparing external assets, the algorithm will perform a check on both the target 
(unknown) IP’s assets and the library entry’s assets to see if one asset is a generic version of the 
other.  In the case that one asset is a generic version of the other, the more specific asset is 
reassigned to the generic asset.  For instance, if the target IP has a DATA_MEMORY asset 
assigned to a signal and is compared to a DATA_SENSITIVE asset from the GRL entry, then 
the target IP’s asset is reassigned to be DATA_SENSITIVE.  This replaces partial matching in 
the algorithm by now giving a 100% match to assets that are similar instead of 50% because the 
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more specific asset has been reassigned.  The process of reassignment does not damage any 
original intent of assets assigned because each reassigned asset keeps the same general purpose 
as the original assignment.  The only change that occurs is that a specific asset changes to its 
generic equivalent.   
3.2 Statistical Weighting 
3.2.1 Overview 
As explained in Section 2.2, the overall percent match between the target IP and a GRL 
entry is calculated by taking the average of the six percent matches from the six characteristics 
that make up an asset pattern.  Figure 3 below illustrates the equation used for this process and 
denotes the six characteristics as “A” through “F”.   
 
Figure 3: Equal Weight Percent Match 
One drawback to averaging all percent matches from the characteristics is that each 
characteristic then contributes equal weight to the overall percent match.  However, external 
assets provide more information to a soft IP’s functionality because external assets currently 
offer more specific descriptions of how a signal functions within an IP.  While internal assets do 
contribute to the signal’s overall asset trace, they do not provide information on what function 
the signal provides to the overall design.  On the other hand, an external asset, such as 
DATA_MEMORY, provides a specific description that the signal is both data and contributes to 
some type of memory.  In theory, external asset characteristics should be weighted more when 
calculating the overall percent match. 
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3.2.2 Assessing Asset Quantity 
A common practice in statistical analysis is to weight final results when working with a 
subgroup that is either underrepresented or overrepresented relative to the size of the full group.  
For example, if the population of the Earth is known to be 51% female and 49% male, but a 
survey involving just a small group is made up of 60% male and 40% female, then the final 
results should be weighted.  The female results should be multiplied by 51 over 40 (greater than 
1) to account for females being underrepresented in the poll.  Similarly, the male results should 
be multiplied by 49 over 60 (less than 1) to account for males being overrepresented in the poll. 
Tying in with asset pattern matching, a similar approach was considered to help weight the 
six characteristics.  For each GRL entry and the target IP, the number of assets per characteristic 
was recorded.  Next, the GRL entries were split into groups based on their functionalities (Table 
3).  
Table 4: Asset Quantity Example 












1 6 2 4 3 3 5 
2 2 2 0 3 0 5 
3 5 2 3 3 3 5 
4 5 4 3 1 4 10 
5 9 5 5 5 5 5 
6 8 2 5 3 3 5 
7 7 2 5 2 3 8 
8 9 7 5 5 2 7 
9 4 2 2 4 1 6 
10 7 2 6 1 4 2 
 
Table 4 provides an example of breaking down the GRL entries into their functionalities.  
Each row in Table 4 is a different GRL entry with a COMMUNICATION functionality.  The 
remaining columns to the right of the GRL entry number column represent the six 
characteristics: input ports assigned external assets, input ports assigned internal assets, external 
ports assigned external assets, external ports assigned internal assets, internal signals assigned 
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external assets, and internal signals assigned intern assets.  The numbers underneath each 
characteristic column represent the number of assets defined in the characteristic for these 10 
GRL entries.   
In the statistical example provided earlier in this section, weight was determined by 
taking the known value divided by the sampled value.  In the case of soft IPs, there is no known 
number of assets that should be in each characteristic because soft IPs can be designed in 
numerous ways but still retain the same overall functionality.  Therefore, for each GRL entry in 
Table 4, weight was determined for each characteristic by taking the larger number of assets 
(comparing number of assets in a characteristic between a GRL entry and the target IP) divided 
by the smaller number.  After calculating individual sets of weights for each GRL entry, a final 
set of weights was determined for each functionality by taking an average weight for each 
characteristic.   
This process of determining a set of weights for each functionality in the GRL proved to 
harm the overall percent match by matching target IPs to library entries that did not have the 
same functionality.  The inefficient nature of this approach relates to the idea that soft IPs can be 
designed differently but still retain the same overall functionality.  This fact indicates that the 
number of assets in a characteristic provides no correlation to an IP’s functionality.  The idea of 
weighting characteristics was added to the matching process in order to account for the fact that 
certain assets provide more information to an IP’s functionality.  Consequently, the method for 
determining weight should seek to use data that reflects how well assets in the GRL are matching 
to the target IP as opposed to the number of assets.  In other words, weight should consider the 
quality of assets in the GRL. 
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3.2.3 Assessing Asset Quality  
Assessing the quality of assets in the GRL focuses on the frequency in which each asset 
appears in the library.  Matching assets that appear in all entries of the library provides little 
information regarding which entry is most similar to the target IP as compared to assets that only 
appear in a few entries.  For instance, the SYSTEM_TIMING asset is commonly found in most 
library entries because most entries have some type of timing component.  On the other hand, the 
DATA_ENCRYPTION asset is more commonly found in entries with an ENCRYPTION 
functionality but is not common to all entries.  Therefore, a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset can 
provide more information about which entries are most similar to the target instead of a more 
common asset, such as SYSTEM_TIMING.  With this in mind, weighting should emphasize the 
differences in frequency of each asset in the GRL. 
In order to determine weight for the six characteristics described in Section 2.1.5, the first 




Figure 4: Probability of Asset in GRL 
The equation in Figure 4 runs through all “n” GRL entries and will either add one to the 
numerator if the GRL entry contains the asset, or zero if the GRL entry does not contain the 
asset.  If multiple instances of the same asset exist in any one GRL entry, only one is added to 
the total because the probability checks only for the presence of an asset.  The number of entries 
that contain the asset is then divided by the total number of GRL entries to obtain the probability 






Table 5: Example GRL 
GRL Entry # Assets 
1 SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_ENCRYPTION, PROCESS_SENSITIVE 
2 SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_MEMORY, PROCESS_SENSITIVE 
3 SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_MEMORY, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN 
4 CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, ADDRESS_SENSITIVE 
5 SYSTEM_TIMING, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN 
 
Table 5 provides an example GRL to demonstrate calculating asset probability.  There are 
six unique assets defined in this GRL: SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_ENCRYPTION, 
PROCESS_SENSITIVE, DATA_MEMORY, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, and 
ADDRESS_SENSITIVE.  The probability for SYSTEM_TIMING is equal to four divided by 
five because SYSTEM_TIMING is present in four of the five GRL entries.  The probability for 
the remaining assets would be calculated in the same manner. 
With the probability of each asset calculated, the next step involves calculating a weight for 
each asset. 
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡BCCDE = 1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) 
 
Figure 5: Asset Weight Calculation 
As shown in Figure 5, an asset weight is determined by subtracting the probability of an 
asset from one.  This type of calculation is thus determining the probability that an asset will not 
be in a GRL entry.  By assigning weight in this manner, assets that are not commonly found in 
GRL entries will have higher weights compared to assets that show up frequently in the GRL.   
After determining the weight for each asset in the GRL, one final set of weights for the six 







Figure 6: Characteristic Average Asset Weight 
 Figure 6 describes how to calculate the average weight of the matched assets in an 
arbitrary characteristic.  The numerator keeps a running total of asset weights for each asset that 
was matched within a characteristic.  The sum of matched asset weights is then divided by the 
total number of matched assets in the characteristic to obtain an average weight.  If the 
calculation shows that a characteristic has a relatively high weight, this indicates that assets 
matched within this characteristic tended to have higher weight.  As a result, the assets within 
this characteristic are less common in the GRL.  Therefore, the characteristic should receive a 
higher weight relative to the other characteristics when calculating the overall percent match 
because the assets within the characteristic provide a more unique identification to the 





Figure 7: Characteristic Weight Calculation 
 Figure 7 illustrates the final step in calculating the weight for an arbitrary characteristic, 
“char.”  The average asset weight, determined from the equation in Figure 6, of “char” is divided 
by the sum of all characteristics’ average asset weights.  The quotient is then converted into a 
percentage based on each characteristic’s contribution to the total average asset weight from all 
six characteristics.  As a result, characteristics with higher average asset weight are weighted 
more in the overall percent match calculation, which reflects the idea of weighting characteristics 
based on the weight, or quality, of assets matched.   
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4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Overview 
During testing, results from [13] were used to confirm the tool’s ability to maintain correct 
classification with the changes made to the matching algorithm.  The tested IPs include RS232, 
Basic-RSA, and AES.  In addition to these relatively smaller designs, a few microcontrollers 
were used to test the improved algorithm.  Due to the fact that the current state of the GRL 
contains very few IPs similar in size to a microcontroller, the statistical based algorithm should 
help extract important asset matches to obtain the best classification for each microcontroller.   
4.2 Examples 
4.2.1 RS232, Basic-RSA, AES Modules 
A RS232 Trojan-infested module used during testing includes RS232-T700.  RS232-T700 
contains a Trojan in its transmitter which produces a denial-of-service attack on the module by 
forcing the transmitter’s done signal to be stuck at 0. 
Table 6: RS232-T700 Matching Results 
 Equal Weight Matching Statistical Based Matching 
Target IP Functionality  % Match Functionality % Match 
Uart.vhd COMMUNICATION 100% COMMUNICATION 100% 
U_xmit.vhd TROJAN_COMMUNICATION 99.206% TROJAN_COMMUNICATION 99.490% 
U_rec.vhd COMMUNICATION 90% COMMUNICATION 94.641% 
 
Table 6 shows results from both the original and improved matching algorithms.  In both 
instances the algorithm correctly classifies the transmitter as containing a Trojan and thus 
demonstrates the new algorithm’s ability to keep correct results from previous work.   
 The Basic-RSA module tested was BasisRSA-T200.  This module is another denial-of-






Table 7: BasicRSA-T200 Matching Results 
 Equal Weight Matching Statistical Based Matching 
Target IP Functionality  % 
Match 
Functionality  % 
Match 
RSACypher.vhd TROGAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT 74.900% TROGAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT 83.426% 
Modmult.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 92.5% COMPUTATIONAL 100% 
 
 
Similar to the results of RS232-T700, this design was correctly classified by both 
versions of the matching algorithm.  
Finally, AES-T600 was used to further confirm the improved algorithm’s ability to 
maintain correct classification.  The secret key of the module can be discovered after a certain 
plaintext is read.  As shown in Table 8, the algorithm correctly classifies the IP as containing a 
Trojan.   
Table 8: AES-T600 Matching Results 
 Equal Weight Matching Statistical Based Matching 
Target IP Functionality  % Match Functionality  % Match 
Top.vhd TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT 45% TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT 44.017% 
Aes_128.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
Expand_key_128.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
S4.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
S.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
One_round.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
Table_lookup.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
T.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
xS.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
Final_round.vhd ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% ENCRYPTION_UNIT 100% 
Trojan_trigger.vhd TROJAN_TRIGGER 66.667% TROJAN_TRIGGER 98.694% 




The benchmark PIC16F84-T100, acquired from Trust-Hub [10, 11], demonstrates 
improvement in the overall percent match using the statistical weighting method described in 
Section 3.2.3.  Additionally, this microcontroller offers the GRL an additional trusted IP that is 
relatively larger than most entries in the top-level section of the library.  This microcontroller is 
made up of two different types of memory (EEPROM and RAM), a watchdog timer, interrupt 
ports, and I/O ports.  Each of these components of the design are contained within one VHDL 
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file.  Once parsed by the SC tool, assets are assigned to the primary input and output ports.  
These ports, and their corresponding assets, are provided in Table 9.   
































Rd_eep_ack_i HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, READ 
Rd_eep_req_o HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, READ 






Wr_eep_ack_i HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, WRITE 
Wr_eep_req_o HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, WRITE 
Writeram_o HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP 
 
 After completing asset assignment, the SC tool filters these assets to connected signals as 
described in Section 2.1.4.  Finally, the matching process was carried out both with equal 
characteristic weights (no asset reassignment) and statistical characteristic weights (with asset 













Table 10: PIC Original Matching Results 










Table 11: PIC Statistical Matching Results 







Table 10 provides the top five overall percent matches from equal weighting of the 
characteristics and no asset reassignment.  Table 11 provides the top five overall percent matches 
from statistical weighting of the characteristics with asset reassignment.  While statistical 
weighting did lower all percent matches, the overall results indicate better matching with GRL 
entries that are most similar to the target’s functionality.  The calculated weights for the 
characteristics when matching this microcontroller were 20.908 for “input external”, 8.037 for 
“input interal”, 26.276 for “output external”, 8.156 for “output internal”, 26.406 for. “signal 
external”, and 9.345 for “signal internal”.  As expected, characteristics with external assets were 
weighted more due to the fact that they provide assets that produce a better description of each 
IP’s functionality.  Analyzing the results of Table 10, most GRL entries were within a few 
percentage points of the next best match.  However, the results from Table 11 show greater 
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disparity among the results which indicates that the algorithm provided more separation based on 
assets that were within each library entry.  The “simple_pic” entry matched the most assets of 
high weight with PIC16F84-T100 which reflects the idea of matching based on quality of assets.  
This also proves the effectiveness of the statistical approach because the GRL entry that is most 
similar in functionality to the PIC microcontroller is indeed the “simple_pic”.   
4.2.3 MC8051-T500 Core 
The 8051-microcontroller core tested is known to be Trojan-free.  The core is made up of 
control units for a finite state machine (FSM) and memory, an ALU (with several specialized 
blocks for computations), a serial interface unit (SIU), and a timing unit (also handles interrupt 
signals).  External assets were assigned to the core’s top module, “MC8051_core.vhd”.  
Additionally, external assets were assigned to some of the core’s internal signals because not all 
subcomponents of the IP were fully connected to the primary ports of the top module.  As 
aforementioned, asset filtering would not be able to fully define the signals of subcomponents 
without the manual assignment of internal signals.  Once asset assignment was complete, asset 
filtering was performed, and the matching process was done on the core using both equal weight 
and statistical weight for the characteristics. 
Table 12: MC8051-T500 Core Matching Results 
 Equal Weight Matching Statistical Based Matching 
Target IP Functionality % Match Functionality % Match 
MC8051_core.vhd COMMUNICATION 35.321% INTERRUPT_UNIT 50.899% 
MC8051_control.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 44.871% REGISTER_FILE 54.689% 
Control_fsm.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 47.767% REGISTER_FILE 38.913% 
Control_mem.vhd INTERRUPT_UNIT 61.576% INTERRUPT_UNIT 62.274% 
MC8051_alu.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 22.244% COMPUTATIONAL 29.564% 
Alumux.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 55.565% COMPUTATIONAL 46.519% 
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Table 12 (Cont.) 
 Equal Weight Matching Statistical Based Matching 
Target IP Functionality % Match Functionality % Match 
Alucore.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 50.297% COMPUTATIONAL 42.133% 
Addsub_core.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 44.250% COMPUTATIONAL 41.169% 
Addsub_cy.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 46.875% COMPUTATIONAL 44.748% 
Addsub_ovcy.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 46.875% COMPUTATIONAL 44.748% 
Comb_mltplr.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 45.833% COMPUTATIONAL 38.863% 
Comb_divider.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 37.500% COMPUTATIONAL 35.399% 
Dcml_adjust.vhd COMPUTATIONAL 31.718% COMPUTATIONAL 34.492% 
MC8051_siu.vhd COMMUNICATION 77.152% COMMUNICATION 70.793% 
MC8051_tmrctr.vhd REGISTER_FILE 52.257% INTERRUPT_UNIT 48.587% 
 
When matching the top-level module, “MC8051_core.vhd”, the equal weighting matching 
process determined the functionality of the core to be COMMUNICATION while the statistical 
based process determined the functionality to be INTERRUPT_UNIT.  The INTERRUPT_UNIT 
functionality comes from the “simple_pic” GRL entry.  Matching the 8051-microcontroller with 
another microcontroller proves that the statistical algorithm found the best way to match the top-
level module.  The 8051-core and “simple_pic” are still very different which is reflected in the 
50% match at the top-level.  The next three control files in Table 12 all matched with 
functionalities that differed from expected.  In theory, each design should match best with a 
CONTROL_GENERATION functionality because each is intended to generate control signals 
for the microcontroller.  However, the GRL contains very few entries within this functionality 
and the entries that do exist are related to program counters.  The next few files in Table 12, 
starting from “MC8051_alu.vhd” and going to “dcml_adjust.vhd”, are shown to be correctly 
classified as COMPUTATIONAL by both matching approaches.  Next, “MC8051_siu.vhd” is a 
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serial interface component of the microcontroller which confirms the correct classification of 
COMMUNICATION by both matching processes.  Finally, “MC8051_tmrctr.vhd” contains 
control signals for both timing and interrupt components of the 8051-core.  Consequently, this 
design theoretically matches best with a TIMING or INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality.  In the 
equal weight example, this component of the 8051 matches incorrectly with a REGISTER_FILE 
functionality due to the large number of data assets that inflated its percent match with register 
files in the GRL.  However, the statistical based approach extracted a better match with an 
INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality which reflects the designs interrupt control signals.  The low 
percent match in the statistical approach demonstrates that the best match is still different from 
the component of the 8051-core.    
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The statistical based matching algorithm, with asset reassignment, proved to enhance the 
matching algorithm for the Structural Checking tool.  By calculating weights for individual 
assets, the tool can better determine how well an asset can uniquely identify a soft IP.  Using 
asset weights helped facilitate a way to weight the six characteristics by providing a numerical 
representation of how important each characteristic is to classification.  Characteristics with 
relatively high weights contained more assets that provide a more unique identification for a 
target IP.  The tests done in this thesis indicate that the statistical based algorithm is an effective 
approach to matching.  In the tests performed in Section 4.2.1, all Trojan test cases were not only 
classified correctly but were also given a higher percent match using the statistical matching 
process.  Furthermore, the microcontrollers tested were able to match with similar library entries 
but with relatively low percent matches.  The low percent matches reflect the fact that the GRL 
does not contain very many TOP_CONTROLLER entries and thus makes it difficult for a 
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microcontroller to find a high percent match.  To increase the percent match of soft IPs similar in 
size to a microcontroller, more designs of that size can be added to the GRL in the future.  In 
addition to more GRL entries, the matching algorithm can continue to improve with additional 
assets in order to better refine the purpose of each signal within an IP.  Finally, future work can 
also continue to grow the list of functionalities to provide the matching algorithm with more 
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